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Static Information Flow Analysis
Determines whether the value of a variable x is influenced by
the value of another variable y
Typically based on non-interference: Changes to a sensitive
variable y should not result in changes to a public variable x
Information flow literature dominated by static analysis
Purely dynamic analysis techniques cannot capture
non-interference
Operate on type-safe high-level languages
Static analysis is difficult on binaries — especially on malware,
which often employs obfuscation techniques
Even disassembly is hard.
Result: techniques that operate on COTS software typically
use dynamic analysis
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Dynamic Information Flow Analysis
... or Taint Analysis in a Nutshell
Determines, at runtime, whether a variable x is influenced by
another variable y
Track how a program’s untrusted data (input) flows into
security-sensitive sinks
x := y (explicit data-dependent flow)
if y = k then x = k
′
(explicit control-dependent flow)
Implicit flows are not handled.
x = 0;
if y = 1 then x = 1
Note: x has no control dependence on y when y = 0
↑ Enforce security policies on sinks to detect improper usage of
tainted data
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On the Limits of Information Flow Techniques
Motivation
Dynamic information-flow techniques have been used in the
context of
Benign applications
Memory errors
Command and SQL injection, Cross-Site Scripting, . . .
Untrusted (i.e., potentially malicious) applications. Examples:
To detect remote control bot-like behavior
To discover trigger-based (malicious) behaviors
To detect plug-ins run-time violation of policies
⇒ Subjected to a slew of evasion techniques, as we’ll show in this
talk
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Information Flow for Malware Analysis/Containment I
Detecting remote control bot-like behavior
Stinson et al. suggested a dynamic information flow technique for
detecting “remote control” behavior
Bots receive commands from a central site and carry them out
⇒ Manifestation of a flow of information from an input
operation to an output operation
Implementation relied on content-based tainting, which is
easily evaded (as noted by Stinson et al)
↓ What we show: malware can easily defeat any dynamic
taint-tracking implementation
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Information Flow for Malware Analysis/Containment II
Analyzing Run-time Behavior of Shared-Memory Extensions
Egele et al. suggested a dynamic information flow for tracking the
flow of confidential data as processed by web browser and Browser
Helper Objects (BHOs)
The actions of BHOs loaded in the address space (AS) of the
browser are monitored
Needs to distinguish the execution contexts, i.e., proper and
improper use of tainted or sensitive data
As used by the browser itself
As used by the BHOs on their own
As used by the browser on behalf of the BHOs
↓ What we show: New attacks that (a) involve BHO corruption
of browser data, (b) confuse attribution, or (c) evade
taint-tracking mechanisms
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Information Flow for Malware Analysis/Containment III
Analyzing Future Behavior of Malware
Moser et al. suggested a dynamic information flow technique to
discover malware behaviors by exploring execution paths
Taints trigger-related inputs (e.g., calls to obtain time,
network reads)
Dynamic taint-tracking exploited to discover input-dependent
conditionals
Use a decision procedure to generate values for program
variables that can result in execution of untaken branch
↓ What we show: Memory errors can embedded in malware to
prevent discovery of input-dependent branches
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Evasion Using Control Dependence
1 char y[256], x[256];
2 ...
3 int n = read(network, y, sizeof(y));
4 for (int i=0; i < n; i++) {
5 switch (y[i]) {
6 case 0: x[i] = (char)13; break;
7 case 1: x[i] = (char)14; break;
8 ...
9 case 255: x[i] = (char)12; break;
10 default: break;
11 }
12 }
y gets copied into x even though there is no explicit direct
assignment between them
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Evasion Using Covert Channels
Implicit Flows: Copying an arbitrary quantity of data
1 void memcpy(u_char *dst, const u_char *src, size_t n) {
2 u_char tmp;
3
4 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
5 for (u_char j = 0; j < 256; j++) {
6 tmp = 1;
7 if (src[i] != j) {
8 tmp = 0;
9 }
10 if (tmp == 1) {
11 dst[i] = j;
12 }
13 }
14 }
15 }
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Implications
Increase of false positives if control-dependences are tracked
⇒ Diminish the ability to distinguish between benign and
malicious behavior
Enhancement to resist against implicit-flows evasion
Treat all data written by an untrusted application to be tainted
⇒ Fine-grained taint-tracking does not provide a benefit over a
coarse-grained, conservative technique
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Evasions
Attacks by corrupting the shared address space
Without touching “sensitive” data
Corrupt a file descriptor rather than data that is written
Corrupt domain name (rather than cookies) within a data
structure that keeps track of associations between them
Attacking attribution mechanisms
Modify browser data so that it executes code paths chosen by
BHO
Violate stack conventions, e.g., return-to-libc attack
Violate ABI conventions
Attacking meta-data integrity
A BHO M races with a benign BHO or core browser to
operate on sensitive data having them marked as untainted
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Known Evasions
The underlying problems faced by the analysis are undecidable
in general (as noted by the authors)
A condition C based on one-way hash functions
Exploration of unbounded number of branches
However, attacks that exploit these problems may trigger
suspicion and prompt a more detailed analysis by an expert.
Our goal: develop attacks that are unlikely to raise suspicion
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Using Memory Errors for Evasion
1 int trigger;
2 void procInput(void) {
3 int *p = &buf[0];
4 char buf[4096];
5 ...
6 gets(buf);
... 7
*p = 1; 8
... 9
if (trigger) 10
malcode(); 11
} 12
trigger has to be marked tainted, to disclose malcode
trigger is never tainted unless p points to it
Deciding whether p could point to trigger is undecidable
. . . but the analysis proposed by Moser et al. could
potentially detect the overflow of buf is possible
⇒ not stealthy-enough ...
Idea: Make it difficult to discover the possibility of memory error,
and to generate an input that exploits it.
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A Stealthier Technique
...
int trigger=0;
...
void procInput(void) {
int pad, n, l;
char buf[4096+256];
int *p = &pad; char *dst;
...
n = read(s, buf, sizeof (buf));
l = computespace(buf, n);
dst = alloca(l + 128);
decode(buf, l, dst);
...
*p = 1;
...
if (trigger)
malcode();
}
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Making Harder to Infer Functions’ Properties
int computespace(char *src, int nread) {
int i, k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nread; i++) {
switch(src[i]) {
case 0: k++; break;
...
case 255: k++; break;
}
}
return k;
}
computespace is easy to compute
. . . but it’s hard to automatically understand that, at the end
of the computation, k is equal to the length of buf
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Introducing the Vulnerable Condition
void decode(char *src, int nread, char *dst) {
int i, j;
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < nread; i++, j++) {
switch(src[i]) {
case 0: dst[j] = src[i]; break;
...
case 113: dst[j++] = src[i];
dst[j] = src[i];
break;
case 114: dst[j] = src[i]; break;
...
case 255: dst[j] = src[i]; break;
}
}
}
decode introduces the condition for an overflow to occur
⇒ dst overflows into p under certain conditions
The overflow detection requires 256127 tests on the average
Detection alone, however, does not disclose the malicious code
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Information flow techniques have been studied for decades
Dynamic tainting techniques are quite robust in the context of
software from trusted sources
Promising results have been achieved by using these
techniques for malware containment and analysis
However, malware writers can easily adapt their code to evade
dynamic taint analysis
Utility of taint analysis is rather limited in the context of today’s
binary-based software deployment models
Need to develop additional analysis techniques that
complement information flow
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